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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JEAN SEELEY (PARK), 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
LEO P. PARK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of the efforts of a divorced 
woman to force her ex-husband to make child support 
payments, both those in arrears and those coming due 
in the future. The action was initiated by the woman's 
motion to the District Court for an order finding the 
ex-husband in contempt for having failed to pay child 
support payments in the amount of $40.00 per month 
according to a previous order of the court, and for a 
judgment in the amount of the arrearages in accrued 
child support. 
Case No. 
13643 
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DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The Court heard argument on Plaintiffs motions 
and issued its order awarding judgment to the plaintiff 
in the amount of $5,800.00 as the total amount of arrear-
ages in past due child support payments and ordering 
defendant to pay to the Plaintiff $50.00 per month child 
support, $10.00 of which is to be credited to the arrear-
ages. The court further ordered "that the Statute of 
Limitations does not apply in this case." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the order of the District 
Court which establishes "that the Statute of Limita-
tions does not apply in this case," and, upon reversal 
of such order, Defendant seeks recomputation of the 
arrearages in chuld support and a revision of the Dis-
trict Court's Judgment against the Defendant to reflect 
application of the Statute of Limitations which this 
court finds to apply in this case, or in the alternative 
remand to District Court with directions to redetermine 
arrearages in accordance with decision herein and to 
issue judgment reflecting the result of such redeter-
mination. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced 7 October 1959, and at 
that time the Defendant was ordered to pay the Plaintiff 
child support and alimony. Subsequently the Plaintiff 
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remarried and the Defendent was relieved of paying ali-
mony. The Defendant has been in arrears in his child 
support payments one hundred and forty-five months 
or approximately twelve years. 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COUET ERRED IN ITS JUDGMENT 
AWARDING PLAINTIFF $5,800.00, BECAUSE THE 
COURT'S COMPUTATION OF DEFENDANT'S ARREAR-
AGES IN BACK CHILD SUPPORT WAS ERRONEOUS. 
The record shows that by judgment rendered 10 
March 1960 based on stipulation of the parties, the defen-
dant owed the plaintiff $260.00. (See Pages 21 and 23 
of the Court Record) in unpaid child support and ali-
mony through 6 March 1960. By this date the plaintiff 
had remarried and relinquished her claim to alimony. 
From 7 March 1960 through 6 December 1973 a total 
of 165 months had passed, and at $40.00 per month for 
the period, the total amount of accrued child support 
payments comes to $6,600.00. Of that amount the affi-
davit of the plaintiff at pages 31 and 32 of the court 
record admits payments by the defendant during the 
period of about $770.00, some part of which was received 
"within the last month" and $600.00 of which appears 
to have been received since plaintiff moved to Colorado 
but before she suffered a fire loss. The record is not 
clear on this point, but the affidavit seems to place 
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such payments as having been relatively recently made. 
By subtracting $700.00 from $6,600.00 one gets $5,830.00 
or by rounding, $5,800.00. 
Such computation is in error, because it fails, in 
accordance with the order of the court, to apply the 
Statute of Limitations to the computation. 
In computing the amount of arrearages, one is con-
cerned only with accrued installments which have not 
been paid by the defendant. For this reason it is error 
to consider in this appeal the divorce decree which or-
dered that some certain amount be paid monthly to the 
plaintiff by the defendant. 
It is admitted that such a decree is modifiable in 
many respects, but in so far as the amount of any single 
accrued installment is concerned, the court is powerless 
to change it. The amount of an installment becomes 
fixed and finally determined once that installment be-
comes due and payable. Myers v. Myers (1923) 62 Utah 
90, 218 P. 123. Any discussion of laches, Statute of 
Limitations, or any other defense in relation to the de-
cree which established the requirement to pay monthly 
installments is deceiving and not in point here. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 30-3-5 (Supp. 1973) does 
not apply to accrued monthly installments when it 
says, "The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to 
make such subsequent changes or new orders with re-
spect to the support and maintenance of the parties, the 
custody of the children and their support and mainten-
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ance, or the distribution of the property as shall be rea-
sonable and necessary/' but is rather talking about 
things prospectively including future alimony and child 
support payments. 
Changes in the amount of support can only be made 
with respect to future payments which may accrue under 
the terms of the divorce decree, the Court being power-
less to alter the amounts which have accrued in favor 
of a party prior to the time of the making of an order. 
Cole v. Cole, 101 Utah 355, 122 P.2d 201, and cases there 
cited. 
There are four possible answers to the question of 
whether or not the Statute of Limitations applies to 
actions involving attempts to obtain payments of over-
due installments of child support (and by analogy Ali-
mony); (a) Neither laches nor the Statute of Limita-
tions applies, (b) Laches applies exclusively, (c) Stat-
ute of Limitations applies exclusively, (d) Both laches 
and the Statute of Limitations may apply in a particular 
case. 
The public policy of the law is to avoid stale claims 
and to finally put to rest all litigation, and such policy 
mitigates against a conclusion that neither Laches nor 
the Statute of Limitations applies. 
Defendant concedes that as a general proposition 
the doctrine of laches is appropriate to actions similar to 
the one which resulted in the judgnmet being appealed 
herein. Kaiser v. Kaiser, (1921), 213 Mich. 660, 181 N.W. 
993; Herzog v. Bramel, (1933), 82 Utah 216, 223, 23 P.2d 
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345; Smith v. Smith, (1930), 77 Utah 60, 291 P. 298; 
Hollis v. Bryan, (1932), 166 Miss. 874, 143 So. 689; Mc-
Gill v. McGill, (1917), 100 Kan 324, 166 P. 501. 
The Statute of Limitations in the State of Utah 
applies by its terms to all civil actions without regard to 
whether or not they are actions at law or actions at 
equity. "Civil actions can be commenced only within 
the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the causes 
of actions shall have accrued, . . ." Sec. 78-12-1, U.C.A. 
(1953). "The sought enforcement of the order or decree 
with respect to the payment of the decreed alimony (is) 
. . . a proceeding civil in nature, . . ." Herzog v. Bramel, 
82 Utah 216, 223, 23 P.2d 345. 
This case arose out of efforts of plaintiff to enforce 
a divorce decree in so far as it ordered the payment of 
child support, so by Herzog above, it and other cases 
like it are civil and subject to the statute of limitations. 
Since the defense of the statute of limitations must 
be pleaded, the defendant often is in control of whether 
or not in a particular case it is used exclusively, but in 
the general case it seems obvious that both Laches and 
the Statute of Limitations may be pleaded for consid-
eration by the court, and often when only Latches is 
pleaded the court will weigh its appropriateness in a 
particular case against a Statute of Limitations. 
In considering which of the specific periods of limi-
tations apply to the present case we should observe what 
has taken place. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
When a court awards a decree of divorce it often 
awards either or both alimony and child support in 
indefinite amount to be paid over an indeterminate 
period in monthly installments of a fixed amount. In 
rendering such a decree the court retains authority over 
the matter until the alimony and child support obliga-
tions end, but until that time the court may by its 
equity power make any modifications to the amounts of 
future payments it desires. The court however, has no 
power whatsoever to alter the amounts of such payments 
which have accrued, whether paid or not. It was the de-
cree that awarded the amount of each monthly install-
ment and such amount may be changed from time to 
time, so in that sense the decree is not final. The decree, 
however, becomes final as to each installment as that 
installment becomes due and payable. It is for this 
reason that to say that "orders for child support pay-
ments are not judgments" recognizes only half the fact 
and misses the problem entirely. 
If one concentrates on only the single accrued and 
unpaid installment of child support, which has been 
said to be a lien as it became due, and if he considers the 
effect of the plaintiffs failure over an extended period 
to foreclose the lien, it becomes evident that at some 
point she should be estopped from doing so. Openshaw 
v. Openshaw, (1943), 105 Utah 574, 144 R2d 528. It is 
only when one thinks of the sum total of all accrued 
installments that he is confused. 
A search of the Sections of Chapter 78-12, Utah Code 
Annotated discloses no statutory time limit expressly 
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applicable to bringing actions to enforce payment of 
child support or alimony, but there is Section 78-12-25, 
Utah Code Annotated which prescribes in subparagraph 
(2) a four year limitation for "An action for relief not 
otherwise provided by law." Applying this limitation 
period would result in a maximum awardable arrearage 
of $1,820.00, but if the $770.00 amount admittedly paid by 
the defendant had been paid during the most recent four 
years, the maximum awardable amount would have to 
be reduced to $1,150.00. 
Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, prescribes 
an eight year limitation during which an action based 
on "a judgment or decree" may be brought. Applying 
this period of limitation would result in a maximum 
awardable arrearage of $3,840.00, and again if the $770.00 
admittedly paid by the defendant had been paid during 
the most recent eight years, the maximum awardable 
amount would have to be reduced to $3,040.00. 
Certainly, since the general Statute of Limitations 
is by its own terms applicable to all court actions, one of 
the periods of limitations specified therein must be appli-
cable to actions to recover arrearages in child support 
and alimony, therefore, it is submitted that one or the 
other of the above provisions of limitations applies to 
cases similar to the present case. Since Section 78-12-25 
is both the most severe against a plaintiff and by its 
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terms a catchall provision for any situation not other-
wise covered, we should first explore the applicability 
of Section 78-12-22. 
Applying the analysis found at page 29, 49 C.J.S., 
Judgments, to accrued installments of alimony and child 
support it must be concluded that such accrued install-
ments are more like judgments than they are like orders: 
"Judgments generally are distinguished from 
rules or orders in that a judgment is the final de-
termination of the rights of the parties ending the 
suit, whereas a rule or order is an interlocutory 
determination of some subsidiary or collateral mat-
ter, not disposing of the merits." 
The acrual of an installment finally determines the 
rights of the parties in the amount of the installment 
and thus ends all debate on the subject. The suit is 
finished. There is no more issue as to that installment. 
Other sources confirm this conclusion. "Judgment" 
as used in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure includes 
a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. See 
Rule 54 (a). A decree is a judgment of a court of equity 
and may be interlocutory or final. Black's Law Diction-
ary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1968. An order is a decision 
on a motion, while a judgment is a decision on a trial. 
Cox v. Dixie Power Co., 81 Utah 94, 16 P.2d 916. Before 
the court in the present case established the amount 
of the installments generally there was a trial. He 
issued a decree. Such decree was interlocutory in those 
respects dealing with future child support, because the 
amount of such support was subject to change. The 
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amount of any one installment was left undecided until 
the day it became due. In effect the decree as it related 
to that one installment became final on that day, and it 
was the result of a trial, but it could have been the result 
of an order. It really doesn't matter, because, if it is an 
order, on the day the installment accrues it becomes an 
order to pay a specific amount of money to the plain-
tiff, and Rule 7(b) ((2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states, "An order for the payment of money may be 
enforced by execution in the same manner as if it were 
a judgment." The effect is the same whether the install-
ment be considered a judgment or an order. 
Kansas law recognizes such a conclusion: "It is well 
settled that where alimony or child support is ordered 
paid in installments, each installment when due is to 
be regarded as a judgment taking effect as of the date 
due (Sharp v. Sharp, 154 Kan. 175, 117 P.2d 561; Burnap 
v. Burnap, 144 Kan. 568, 61 P.2d 899), . . ." McKee v. 
McKee, (1941), 154 Kan. 340, 114 P.2d 544. 
Washington State has come to a similar result. The 
court there held that, "As each separate installment 
awarded by a divorce decree for support of a minor child 
of the parties constitutes a judgment as it becomes due, 
. . ." Schumacher v. Schumacher, (1946), 26 Wash. 23, 
172 P.2d 841, 812. 
Other states have concluded that installments of 
alimony and child support are judgments when they 
became due, and such states are indicated by the follow-
ing citations to cases standing for the proposition: Arndt 
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v. Burghardt, (1917), 165 Wis. 312, 162 N.W. 317; Sim-
mons v. Simmons, (1940), S.D , 290 N.W. 319; 
Simonton v. Simonton, (1920), 33 Idaho 255, 193 P. 386; 
Bennett v. Tomlinson, (1928), 206 Iowa 1075, 221 N.W, 
837; Gaston v. Gaston, (1896), 114 Cal 542, 46 Pac 609; 
Kaiser v. Kaiser, (1921), 213 Mich 660, 181 N.W. 993. 
Even in Utah the Supreme Court has held that a 
"Divorce decree for payment of alimony operates as a 
judgment lien as to all past due and unpaid install-
ments." Openshaw v. Openshaw, (1943), 105 Utah 574, 
144 P.2d 528. 
Having now established that an individual accrued 
installment is a judgment, it follows that Section 78-12-
22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, applies in the present 
case. 
When does the statute of limitations commence 
running? It starts running when the judgment becomes 
final, and the judgment became final the day on which 
the installment became due and payable. The court in 
McKee v. McKee, (1941), 154 Kan. 340, 118 P.2d 544, in 
addition to showing that child support payments which 
are in arrears take on the characteristics of judgments 
went on to say ". . . that the statute of limitations, G.S. 
1935,60-606, Par 6, begins to run as of that date (the date 
the support payment becomes due and is not paid) the 
same as any other judgment. 34 C.J. 10088, par 1534, 34 
Am. Jur. Section 143, . . ." 
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Although not a case in which installments of child 
support are being enforced, Buell v. Duchasne Mercan-
tile Co., (1924), 64 Utah 391, 231 P. 123 is to the point. 
The court there said, "When a judgment is rendered pay-
able in installments, the statute of limitations begins to 
run against it from the time fixed for the payment of 
each installment for the part then payable." quoting 
from 23 Cyc. 1510. Citing Section 6455, Comp. Laws 
Utah 1917 (the provision of which is now found at U.C.A. 
78-12-22,) said, ". . . that action on a judgment must be 
instituted within eight years." and so held in the case 
to support the trial court's decision accordingly. 
The fact that Buell is not a child support case, and 
had an established fixed total amount to be paid in a 
series of installments does not invalidate its message as 
applied to the running of the statute of limitations against 
individually accrued installments, because it is applying 
the statute applicable to enforcement of judgments to 
single installments, just as must be done in the present 
case. In a case seeking to enforce payment of install-
ments awarded by a final judgment, the rule of law is 
that the statute of limitations begins to run on each 
installment as it becomes due and payable. Such a rule 
is even more appropriate in the situation where the 
plaintiff is attempting to enforce a modifiable divorce 
decree which ordered child support or alimony to be 
paid in installments, because the rule provides greater 
predictability and certainty of the law than would a rule 
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predicted on the divorce decree itself. In each case the 
amount of the individual installment became fixed when 
it became due. The result in both cases should be the 
same. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The computation of the defendant's arrearages in 
child support payments must include application of some 
statute of limitations because of the policy of the law 
that dictates that litigation be finally put to rest and 
stale claims be abolished. Laches is appropriate defense, 
but requires more than mere passage of time, something 
more must be shown which in far too many cases cannot 
be shown. The Statute of Limitations Section 78-12-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, by its terms is applicable to 
all civil actions. Actions of the type of the present action 
are civil, so the statute of limitations applies to all actions 
for payment of accrued alimony and/or child support. 
Since each installment that has become due and payable 
is like a final judgment ,the eight year period of limita-
tion or Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
applies to each installment and begins running on the 
day the installment becomes due. 
For that reason, in any computation of arrearages 
in alimony or child support only those accrued and un-
paid installments occurring within the eight year period 
preceding a determination by the court of the arrearage 
may be considered. 
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In the alternative, should the court conclude that 
Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, does not 
apply then it follows that Section 78-12-25 would apply, 
and the period of limitation applicable to the present 
case would be four years. 
Under Section 78-12-22, the arrearages of the de-
fendant and therefore the judgment appealed from 
should be revised by the court to be $3,040.00. Under 
Section 78-12-25, the amount of the judgment appealed 
from should be reduced to $1,150.00. 
In the alternative, the Court should reverse the 
judgment appealed from and remand the case to the Dis-
trict Court for the purpose of recomputation of the 
judgment amount and directing a judgment in the re-
computed amount. 
RONALD C. BARKER 
ELMER THOMAS DAVIS, JR. 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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